Rebutting 6 Myths about HS2

• Trains that travel at 360km/hr use three times the energy of 200kmph trains[2]
• 87% of journeys on HS2 indisputably create more emissions – all the brand new journeys (22%) and all those switching from existing rail services (65%)[3]
• DfT say just 6 in every 100 travellers[4]on HS2 switch from flying. But this assumes the decline in relevant air routes reverses, and satisfying ‘suppressed’ not real air demand[5]
• The air emissions savings depend on the freed-up slots not being used for long haul, which BAA say they will[6], and using out of date numbers on the modal switch from air[7].

A showcase £30bn transport investment should contribute to UK’s 80% emissions cut by 2050.

Environmental organisations agree HS2 is not green eg Green Party: the 13 groups in the Right Lines Charter (that includes CPRE, Greenpeace, FoE, Environmental Law Foundation).

2:  HS2 WON’T bridge the North/South divide, or deliver economic benefits

Government claims for transformational benefits are based on belief, not impartial evidence. The evidence on regeneration[8](where HS2 acts as a catalyst) points to London winning - with high speed rail strengthening the position of the dominant city:

• DfT say more than 7 out of 10 of the 30,000 jobs created by HS2 around stations will be in London[9]ie not the Midlands or the North. (Old Oak Common, with 20,000 jobs wins most)
• Most of the jobs claimed will not be genuinely new jobs but ones that have moved from other areas in the region. HS2 Ltd concluded this, after consulting respected academics[10]
• DfT say 59%[11]of extra HS2 trips are for leisure; given DfT assume[12]trips to London grow at twice the rate of those from London, so more people and more money will go to London
• HS2 impacts on the service sector, in which London is dominant. So work is more likely to move to London, not away from it.

The evidence for the wider economic impacts (of the HS2 investment itself) is also small:

• The productivity benefit from shorter journey times is the key benefit, but it’s already in the business case (and is overstated with DfT admitting that time-on-board is not wasted[13])
• The Wider Economic Impacts of better connectivity are relatively small, £4-£6bn[14], and are mainly driven by use of freed-up capacity, which will need a new further subsidy to realise
• HS2 Ltd asked Imperial College if faster connectivity had any further direct benefits – they said ‘very little’ (max £8m/a)[15]– but their conclusion was left out of the White Paper and is not even referred to in the consultation materials.

3:  HS2 is NOT a sound investment - it's not value for money 

There is no commercial case for spending over £30bn on HS2 or justification for its subsidy:

• The extra fares (£27bn) don’t cover the capital (£30.4bn) and operating costs (£13.9bn), even for the full “Y” network[16], so it needs a subsidy – £17bn.
• The subsidy actually encourages travel (10m/a new journeys[17]for Phase 1 alone) despite DfT’s other initiatives to reduce travel: this is more than all the modal shift put together (6m trips/a)
• Existing rail services will worsen – this is proven in Government’s own case for HS2[18]
• It benefits the affluent – 47% of long distance rail travel is by the top 20% earning families[19]

The latest 2011 business case cuts the benefits by over a third.  The Government’s headline £44bn of benefits for the full “Y” network[20]was well over £70bn just last year, when an independent report by FTI Consulting[21]confirmed the business case was flawed. 

But key assumptions have not changed and are still invalid – if corrected, the case that benefits exceed costs collapses:

• Benefits are overstated by about £27bn:they total more like £17bn not £44bn for the full “Y”[22]. The largest benefit (time savings) is based on all time spent on trains being wasted, with DfT disregarding this fundamental error on spurious grounds[23]
• Demand forecast is excessive:they misuse an out of date model (projecting growth for too long – 35yrs) with discredited forecasting factors.  They forecast a doubling in ‘background growth’ to 2043 – 47%[24]higher than it should be. The uplift for HS2 is also overstated.
• Appraisal uses an unrealistic ‘do minimum’ comparator with virtually no improvements for 35 years and so inflating the benefits such as reduced crowding and shorter waiting times between trains.  They disregard valid better alternatives to improve the existing railway

The overall effect of this is to greatly worsen HS2’s value for money. The Benefit Cost Ratio falls[25]from 1.6/2.0 for London - West Midlands, and from 2.2/2.6 to just 0.3/0.5 for the “Y”.

So HS2 in fact delivers just 30 pence to 50 pence benefit for every £1 of subsidy spent!

The economic case for HS2 also fails to:

• Learn the lessons of HS1 on demand forecasting and competition
• Adjust the case to reflect the fact that the required 18 trains/p/hr is not technically feasible[26]
• Recognise new communications technology or Government’s own initiative to reduce travel
• Develop a ‘best’ alternative, and repeatedly misrepresents the alternatives it did develop
• Properly explore the uncertainties in its long term forecasts, or even apply its own rules

Additionally DfT’s acceptance that time on board trains can be used productively[27]undermines their justification of HS2 being very high speed and their approach to route selection.

4:  A new railway is NOT needed to solve the rail capacity problem 

The Government misrepresent the capacity issue claiming only HS2 can solve it. This is not so:

• WCML full in 6-10yrs?: Network Rail’s (NR) own forecasts don’t say it will be full in 6 -10yrs or ‘completely overcrowded by 2022’: Government repeatedly misrepresent what NR said[28]
• The ‘best’ option: DfT didn’t require the ‘best’ option be developed: ie to make incremental changes against demand; do low cost rolling stock and capacity changes first; address pinch-points when demand is strong enough.  Rail experts say the ‘best’ WCML[29]option is:
• Rolling stock: build on what’s already going to happen (two timetable changes, some longer trains and Evergreen 3): rebalance first and standard class; add more carriages (ultimately to 12 car except for Liverpool). Together this delivers 121% more capacity (181% in standard class) and need not wait to 2026
• Eliminate the acute crowding problem on the Northampton/Milton Keynes to Euston commuting services by modifying Ledburn Jcn without delay
• Infrastructure:do other low cost infrastructure changes as needed. With the rolling stock changes this can give 147% extra capacity (215% in standard class) with an increased train frequency from 9 to 11/hr.  This more than satisfies DfT’s forecast background demand (of 102% increase to 2043) and at much less cost than HS2

Rail experts also say there are low cost ‘best’ solutions for ECML and Midland Main Line too.

• DfT’s own option: even the rail options developed for DfT solve WCML’s capacity issue:

• Rail Package 2 (RP2) involves more rolling stock and removing seven pinch-points. It delivers 151% more capacity[30]on DfT’s own numbers against their 102% growth forecast, not the 54% Government misleadingly claim[31], and RP2 is less crowded[32]
• RP2 looks like being over twice the value for money of HS2 for just one sixth the net cost, and this is despite Government latest attempts[33]to distort and bury RP2
• RP2 won’t be disruption-free but neither is it comparable with the wholesale replacement of WCML under the last upgrade, or the 8-year rebuild of Euston that HS2 requires – described as like ‘open heart surgery on a conscious patient’

The other rail options developed for DfT for other parts of the Y network generally produce huge amounts of additional capacity, which unsurprisingly are not good value for money.

• Other alternatives:these are not properly considered eg Government’s own initiative to reduce travel (by faster connectivity with broadband, videoconferencing); rail pricing options.

5:  HS2 will NOT greatly reduce domestic air travel  

HS2 can only replace domestic air journeys served by its route. No one flies between London and Birmingham, and rail already has 79% of the Manchester market[34].

• For Phase 1 the relevant air market is the 3m/a[35]who fly the NW/Scottish lowlands route using Heathrow (just 15% of all passengers), and 6m/a for all London airports (30% of total). 
• The full “Y” adds Leeds and Newcastle, but scheduled flights to Leeds ended in March 2011, and HS2 in 2032 only matches the current fastest train from Newcastle to London[36].

The Feb 2011 business case has fewer people switching from air to HS2, but is still optimistic:

• DfT say 6% of HS2 trips (8,166/day or 2.9m/a) for Phase 1 switch from air – 25% less than before (11,000/day)[37]– and 6m/a for the full ‘Y’ ie twice the relevant Heathrow route traffic
• To generate even 6% modal shift DfT have to assume the domestic air market will grow – they say by 128% by 2043 (last year DfT said 178% by 2033) – and their forecast is no longer constrained by supply, meaning it’s not even real air journeys that switch to HS2.  That much real growth could not occur without extra runway capacity for London.
• The NW/Scottish lowlands air route has been shrinking (by 32% from its 2004 peak), not growing.  Some domestic air routes have grown (where surface transport links are poor, eg Aberdeen to Exeter), but overall domestic passengers have fallen by 22% from 2005 peak.

Overseas experience shows air can be decimated if HSR delivers very big reductions in journey times[38]and rail gets below the 3hr journey threshold.  Given the 2011 timetable already shows Edinburgh can be reached in 4hrs, albeit by just one train, the HS2 promise of about 3:30-40 mins 21 years later (in 2032), makes any impact on air look marginal, at best.

6:  The UK does NOT need to catch up with Europe - it is still ahead

The UK – unlike Europe – has had a fast national railway system for a long time. As Sir Rod Eddington said in 2006[39]: ‘ ….with [rail] journeys between London and other UK major cities performing particularly well relative to journeys from other European capitals.’

We also have routes capable of 200km/h (125mph) – and still have quicker rail journey times between the capital and the five largest cities than in other major West European countries[40]:

• Averaging 145 minutes in UK  (or 148 mins using the same five cities as Eddington)
• 151 minutes in Spain
• 184 minutes in Italy
• 221minutes in France
• 244 minutes in Germany

Even Frankfurt/Cologne, which is a comparable distance is more like our intercity: it halved its journey time  but only to a little less than the fastest train we already have from Birmingham to London[41].

Faster Speeds are not a priority. Surveys[42] show the UK has a higher journey time satisfaction (92%) -2nd highest in Europe - and scoring higher than any other factor measured in the UK.

‘When the facts change I change my mind. What do you do sir?’ John Maynard Keynes